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Abstract
We present a new modelling framework combining replicator dynamics, the standard
model of frequency dependent selection, with an age-structured population model.
The new framework allows for the modelling of populations consisting of compet-
ing strategies carried by individuals who change across their life cycle. Firstly the
discretization of the McKendrick von Foerster model is derived. We show that the
Euler–Lotka equation is satisfied when the new model reaches a steady state (i.e.
stable frequencies between the age classes). This discretization consists of unit age
classes where the timescale is chosen so that only a fraction of individuals play a sin-
gle game round. This implies a linear dynamics and individuals not killed during the
round are moved to the next age class; linearity means that the system is equivalent to a
large Bernadelli–Lewis–Leslie matrix. Then we use the methodology of multipopula-
tion games to derive two, mutually equivalent systems of equations. The first contains
equations describing the evolution of the strategy frequencies in the whole population,
completed by subsystems of equations describing the evolution of the age structure
for each strategy. The second contains equations describing the changes of the general
population’s age structure, completed with subsystems of equations describing the
selection of the strategies within each age class. We then present the obtained system
of replicator dynamics in the form of the mixed ODE-PDE system which is indepen-
dent of the chosen timescale, and much simpler. The obtained results are illustrated
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by the example of the sex ratio model which shows that when different mortalities of
the sexes are assumed, the sex ratio of 0.5 is obtained but that Fisher’s mechanism,
driven by the reproductive value of the different sexes, is not in equilibrium.
1 Introduction
Among the most important approaches to the modelling of evolutionary processes are
life history optimization and evolutionary games. Classical life history theory (Stearns
1992; Roff 1992) relies on optimizationmodels, where there are no interactions among
individuals and no density dependence:
“Life history evolution usually ignores density and frequency dependence. The
justification is convenience, not logic, or realism” (Stearns 1992).
On the other hand, in classical game theoretic models there is no age or stage
structure. Payoffs describe the averaged lifetime activity of an individual, which can
be found for example in Cressman (1992):
“...an individual’s strategy is fixed over its lifetime or, alternatively, the life history
of an individual is its strategy.”
Thus the synthesis of these perspectives can be very fruitful for theoretical insight
(McNamara 2013). Methods used in life history optimization are closely related to
classical demographic methods such as Bernadelli–Lewis–Leslie matrices (Caswell
2001). However, how to construct a general description of the relationships between
demographic structure and population dynamics is still an unsolved problem (Caswell
2011). More precise than matrix models are continuous approaches arising from
Lotka’s renewal equation (Lotka 1911, Diekmann et al. 2020a, b) and theMcKendrick
von Foerster model (McKendrick 1926). The combination of demography with a
game theoretic perspective focused on frequency dependent selection, advocated by
McNamara (2013), can be very useful since demographers are interested in the pat-
terns produced by heterogeneity in the populations (Vaupel et al. 1979; Vaupel and
Yashin 1983; Hougaard 1984; Vaupel and Yashin 1985). The game theoretic structure
can explain the mechanisms shaping those patterns. The first papers combining both
approaches are Garay et al. (2016) devoted to the particular biological problem of sib
cannibalism, Li et al. (2015) and Lessard and Soares (2018) containing the approach
incorporating age structure into a matrix game. These results show that after intro-
duction of the age structure, matrix notation becomes very complicated and makes
analysis difficult even in the case of two competing strategies and few age classes.
In addition, previous works do not study the interplay between game dynamics and
demographic structure in detail, assuming a fixed demographic structure. However, the
game interactions described by demographic payoffs should affect the demographic
structures of subpopulations of carriers of different strategies. In addition Li et al.
(2015) assumes that payoffs are described by a standard payoff matrix, thus the same
actions performed in different ages/stages will generate the same payoffs. However,
we can expect that outcomes of individual actions may vary for different ages due to
different experiences and physical condition of the playing individuals.
Another problem is that game theoreticmodels operate in abstract terms of costs and
benefits measured in units of fitness mostly without deeper insight into their meaning
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or interpretation. This problem was analyzed in Argasinski and Broom (2012) where
relationships between classical demography and evolutionary games are described
in detail. This approach was later clarified in Argasinski and Broom (2018a, b) by
definition of the vital rates (birth and death rates) as the product of the interaction rates,
describing the distribution of interactions (game rounds) in time and demographic
game payoffs describing the number of offspring and the probability of death during
a single interaction. The main conclusion there is that instead of excess above average
fitness,models should be described explicitly bymortality and fertility, which are basic
opposite forces shaping population dynamics (Doebeli et al. 2017). These results
are significant progress in ecological realism, emphasizing the role of background
mortality and fertility or the turnover of individuals (Argasinski and Kozłowski 2008).
However, that approach is still very primitive. Mortality is described as an exponential
decay of the population, which implies that the length of an individual’s lifetime
is potentially unbounded, and there is no aging and no age specific payoffs. The
goal of this paper is to fill this gap and develop a mathematical structure combining
selection of individual strategies with an age structured population which will allow
us to overcome the problems arising from increasing complexity of the models shown
in Li et al. (2015) and simplifications ignoring the age dependence of payoffs resulting
from certain actions and feedbacks driving the interplay between game dynamics and
demography (the fixed age structure assumption). For practical reasonswewill develop
a high dimensional ODE system consisting of relatively simple equations, which can
be generated by a simple loop and solved in every popular numerical platform.
1.1 The classical approach to evolutionary games and replicator dynamics
In the following subsections, we describe the state of the art in relation to our problem.
A list of existing (and indeed new, see later) parameters are described in Table 1.
Traditionally, in evolutionary game theory the payoff obtained by the j th strategy
is proportional to its Malthusian growth rate r j and the dynamics of selection of
strategies is described by the replicator dynamics (Maynard Smith 1982; Cressman
1992; Hofbauer and Sigmund 1988, 1998; Weibull 1995; Nowak 2006; Broom and
Rychtár 2013; McNamara and Leimar 2020). We can derive this by rescaling the
Malthusian equations for competing strategies ṅ j = n jr j to relative frequencies
q j = n j/n (where n = ∑wj=1 n j and w is the number of strategies), which leads to
q̇ j = q j (r j − r̄) (1)
where r̄ = ∑wj=1 q jr j is the average payoff in the population. However, instead of the
Malthusian parameter describing the payoff we can explicitly consider the individual
fertility f j and mortality d j of a j-strategist. The explicit distinction between fertility
and mortality was proposed also by Doebeli et al. (2017) as the cornerstone of a
mechanistic model of natural selection. Note that in real life organisms are involved
in different types of interactions with others or elements of the environment. Game
theoretic models are focused on the outcomes of the particular interactions (such as
fights as in the Hawk Dove game) responsible for selection of the analyzed trait or
123
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Table 1 List of important symbols
n -population size
n j -number of individuals carrying the j th strategy
τ -interaction rate
f j ( f
i
j )-fertility payoff of the j th strategy (of the j th strategy at age i )
s j (s
i
j = 1 − τdij )-survival payoff of the j th strategy (of the j th strategy at age i )
f̄ j , f̄
i , f̄ -average fertility for the j th strategy, i th age class, whole population
s̄ j , s̄
i , s̄-average survival for j th strategy, i th age class, whole population
r̄ = τ r̃ -Malthusian parameter, product of the interaction rate and the game payoffs
m + 1-number of age classes
w-number of strategies
K -carrying capacity, maximal population load
aij -frequency of individuals at age i among j-strategists
p j -frequency of j-strategists in the population
ai -proportion of individuals in the i th age class
pij -frequency of j-strategists in the i th age class
Pj -sex ratio strategy (fraction of males in the brood of the female)
x (x j )-number of females (carrying the j th strategy)
y (y j )-number of males (carrying the j th strategy)
G j =
(




l=1 (xl + yl )-frequency of the j th strategy gene
P = y/(x + y) -secondary sex ratio (proportion of males)
P̄pr -primary sex ratio (average strategy of females)
S fj =
∑d
l=c alj (1 − Mlj )-proportion of active females among the j th strategy carriers
Smj =
∑b
l=a alj Mlj -proportion of active males among the j th strategy carriers
M j (M
i
j )-sex ratio of the population of the j th strategy carriers (of j th strategy carriers at age i)
k-number of offspring in the brood of a female
Mopj = Smj /
(
Smj + S fj
)
-operational sex ratio of j th strategists
Pop = S̄m/
(
S̄m + S̄ f
)
-operational sex ratio in the population
type of behaviour. These can be described by average demographic outcomes per
interaction f j and d j and these focal interactions will occur at the rate τ f . Other
interactions, not related to the analyzed trait, can be described by average fertility fb
and mortality db, occurring at rate τb.
Products of interaction rates and demographic payoffs will constitute the respective
vital rates: game fertility rate τ f f j and mortality rate τ f d j , background fertility rate
τb fb and mortality rate τbdb. Later the focal game interaction rate τ f can be set to
1 by timescale adjustment and the background fertility and mortality rates become
 = τb fb/τ f and  = τbdb/τ f . In addition we can add density dependent juve-
nile recruitment survival (Argasinski and Kozłowski 2008; Argasinski and Broom
2012, 2018a, b). To do this we should multiply fertilities by the logistic suppression
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coefficient (1 − n/K ) (where the carrying capacity K is interpreted as the maximal
environmental load, Hui 2006). Since fertilities but not mortalities are so scaled, the
turnover of generations will not be suppressed at the equilibrium as it is in the classical
logistic model (which leads to an immortal and childless population at equilibrium
K ). This gives the following variant of the replicator equations:
q̇ j = q j
(















− d̄ − 
)
, (3)
where f̄ = ∑wj=1 q j f j and d̄ =
∑w
j=1 q j d j , the details of which appear in Argasinski
and Broom (2012), Argasinski and Broom (2018a, b).
Itwas shown (Argasinski 2006) that every single population systemdescribed by the
replicator Eq. (1) can be divided into the product of subsystems describing the dynam-
ics in arbitrary chosendisjoint subpopulations (describedby a frequenciesqij = nij/n j ,
where n j = ∑i nij , for the j-th subpopulation) and an additional system describing
the dynamics of proportions between those subpopulations p j = n j/∑z nz . This
is useful when indiviuals differ not only by strategies but also by another second
trait such as sex, age or developmental stage. Then, for example, we can decompose
the population into subpopulations of carriers of the same strategy and describe the
dynamics of the second trait among them. Then the dynamics in each subpopulation
will have the form (1) and will depend on the excess of the strategy payoff from the
average payoff in this subpopulation. Therefore, the same operation can be carried out
for Eq. (2), and we obtain the system:
q̇ij = qij
((





− (dij − d̄ j
))
, (4)
ṗ j = p j
((





− (d̄ j − d̄
))
, (5)





− d̄ − ), (6)
where f ij and d
i
j are the fertility andmortality, respectively, of the i- th type (such as age
or sex) in the subpopulation of the j-th strategy carriers, f̄ j = ∑wi=1 qij f ij and d̄ j =∑w
i=1 qij d
i
j are the mean fertility and mortality, respectively, in the subpopulation of
the j-th strategy carriers and f̄ and d̄ are the respective values in the global population.
Note that we can decompose the initial population with respect to the second trait
and describe the dynamics of strategic composition among individuals in the same
age or sex class. Then the equations will describe variables qij , p j and n.
1.2 The classical approach to themodelling of age structured populations
Now we focus on age structured models (age classes will be indexed by super-
scripts). The classical approach to the modelling of age structured populations is
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related to Bernadelli–Lewis–Leslie matrices (Bernadelli 1941; Lewis 1942; Leslie



















f 0 f 1 . . . f m
s0 0 0 0
0 . . . 0 0



















where there are m + 1 age classes, ni is the size of the i th age class and f i is fertility
and si is survival, respectively, in this class. Thus n0(t + 1) = ∑i ni (t) f i and the
transition between subsequent age classes is ni (t + 1) = si−1ni−1(t). When the time
unit equals the time step between age classes the above system is a good model of age
structure. This age-structured growth model suggests a steady-state, or stable, age-
structure and growth rate. The growth rate can be calculated from the characteristic








sz = 1, (8)
where r is the intrinsic growth rate of the population and
∏i−1
z=0 sz describes survival
to age i . We note here that in reality r will not be an independent parameter, and more-
over will change in time as the distributions of the sizes of age classes change. An
equilibrium distribution over the age classes in turn will allow us to define r in terms
of the other model parameters. A simple ODE generalization of this system with con-
tinuous time but discrete age structure can be obtained by application of the delayed
differential equations (Caswell 2001) where survival rates may describe aggregated
exponential survival between respective age classes (Diekmann et al. 2017). However
this approach may not work if the mortality function depends on the actual population
state (as in game theory). Here the mortality rate may be unknown since it will depend
on the trajectory of the dynamics during the age class. Then we can consider the
continuous time limit of an infinite number of infinitely small age classes where pop-
ulation structure becomes a function n(t, l) of time t and continuous age l describing
a moment in the lifetime of an individual. Then we can imagine the Taylor expansion
analogous to the transition equation describing a small time step dt leading to ageing
dl




dl = s(l)n(t, l)
= (1 − τd(l)dt) n(t, l), (9)
where τd(l) is the continuous timemortality rate (at age l) similarly to the gamemodels
but without the distinction between the focal game and the background interactions.
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= −τd(l)n(t, l), (10)
which should be completed by boundary conditions n(t, 0) = ∫∞0 n(t, l)τ f (l)dl and
initial age distribution n(0, l).
2 The paper structure
In this paper we derive the discretization of the McKendrick von Foerster model
allowing for the derivation of frequency dependent models. This is motivated by the
fact that the discretized approach can be easily numerically solved by basic ODE
solvers from popular numerical platforms. Thus the developed methodology does not
need advanced knowledge in numerical analysis. Another advantage is that it will be
compatible with standard game theoretic notation based on matrix games. Using the
derived discretization we build two approaches to modelling selection among compet-
ing strategies with life cycles in an asexual population. One is focused on the impact of
age structures of strategies on selection, while the second shows the impact of selec-
tion dynamics on the age structure of the whole population. The models obtained are
generalized to mixed PDE-ODE models with continuous non-discretized age struc-
tures to outline the direction of future development. This framework is illustrated by
a sex ratio example combining the two approaches, allowing us to model the sexually
reproducing population. Our intention is to build a simple ready to use modelling
methodology which can be extended in the future. However, we believe that even after
clarification of the PDE based approach and development of simple solvers of coupled
integro-differential PDE-ODE systems, our approach will still be useful for practical
reasons arising from the simplicity of the methods based on matrix payoffs, which are
much simpler to derive than continuous payoff functions. Thus it can be, for example,
easily used for building initial toy models.
3 Results
3.1 Presenting theMcKendrick von Foerster model as a system of ODE’s
In this section we will build the submodel describing the age structure dynamics of a
subpopulation of carriers of some strategy competing with other strategies. Demo-
graphic vital rates will be outcomes of interactions between carriers of different
strategies, interpreted as rounds of evolutionary games as in Argasinski and Broom
(2018a). Thus as in replicator dynamics models we have the state of the population
described by strategy frequencies p j but for each strategy subpopulation we have a
respective age structure described by parameters aij = nij/n j (frequencies of individ-
uals of age i among j-th strategy carriers). Demographic payoffs determining the vital
rates will depend not only on the strategy frequencies p = [p1, . . . , pw] as in the clas-
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sical replicatormodels but also on the age of the opponents, thus the set of vectors of the
age structures for all strategies a = [a1, . . . , aw] (where a j = [a0j , . . . , amj ] describes
the age structure of the j-th strategy carriers subpopulation) should be another argu-
ment of the payoff functions.
A major technical difference between the McKendrick von Foerster model and
replicator dynamics is that the first is a PDE (or system of PDE’s as for example
in Rundnicki and Mackey 1994) and the second is a system of ODE’s. The simple
combination of both approaches will lead to a mathematically elegant but technically
intractable system due to the lack of a general theory for mixed PDE-ODE systems
and software for numerical computation. This methodology should be developed in
the future, however before that, we need a useful approach based on existing solutions.
To solve this problem we can approximate the continuous system by a large number
of ODE’s describing unit interval age classes consisting of all individuals of age from
a to a +1. The discrete structure will allow us to use standard matrix payoff functions.
The chosen time unit should be as long as possible to reduce the number of equations.
Since we want to model frequency dependent selection, the mortality and fertility
payoffs will depend on the trajectory of the population state. Therefore we cannot use
simplified delayed differential equations since we do not know the trajectories during
the time delay interval. Instead we can assume that the unit of a timescale described
by interaction rate τ is short enough that the changes of the population state are small
enoughwith respect to the population size (e.g. 50 births in a population of 30000), that
the resulting changes of frequency dependent birth and death rates will be negligible.
Following “Appendix A” we see that Eq. (10) can be discretized and approximated
by the replicator dynamics (see Fig. 1 for the intuitive presentation of the discretization
scheme for frequency dependent vital rates). In particular for the j th strategy we




j and a scaling parameter n.





− dij (p(t), a(t)) is the game payoff






j (t) is the
respective averaged value. If the growth rates τ r̃ j (t) are nearly constant, then for the
chosen timescale described by interaction rate τ changes of the strategy frequencies
during a single time unit are p j = τ
(1 + τ r̃(t)) p j (t)
(




j p j r̃ j (t)), thus they are sublinear. Here τ should be as big as possible to minimize
the number of equations, but small enough that payoff function arguments p j (and
similarly others) should change their values only slightly (i.e. f ij = f ij (p(t)+p)−
f ij (p(t)) and d
i
j = dij (p(t)+p)−dij (p(t)) are small enough, but not necessarily
infinitesimal), so that the resulting changes of τ f ij and τd
i
j are negligible. Then
the discretization is acceptable and we obtain:
ȧij = ai−1j si−1j (p, a) − aij
(
r̄ j (p, a, n) + 1
)
i = 1, . . . , m, (11)
ṅ j = n j r̄ j (p, a, n), (12)
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where a0j = 1 −
∑m
i=1 aij and the Malthusian parameter describing the growth of the
j th strategy is










+ sij (p, a)
)
− 1. (13)
It is important that age class survival sij (p, a) = (1−τdij (p, a)) describes aggregated
outcomes of the game rounds occurring during a time unit. Therefore it is distinct
from the survival probability of a single round 1 − dij (p, a) which should be used in
trade-off functions when only survivors of the game round can reproduce (Argasinski
and Broom 2012, 2018a, b), leading to fertility (1 − dij (p, a)) f ij . In addition, due to
nearly linear behaviour within a single time unit the system (11,12) is equivalent to the
large Leslie matrix (7) with survival sij (p, a) = (1 − τdij (p, a)) and then parameter
τ describes the fraction of individuals that played the single game round. Parameter
τ always acts as the multiplier of game payoffs f ij and d
i
j (thus the resulting survival
rate is 1 − τdij ). Since in the next sections we will focus on the derivation of the
dynamics, where the structure of the vital rates is not so important, for simplicity we
can incorporate the interaction rate τ into the birth and death vital rates and skip it in
the notation. Therefore, below, τ will be hidden inside functions f ij and s
i
j which will
be interpreted as the vital rates.
Assume the absence of density dependence. Since the r.h.s. of our system (11) is the
negative function of aij , the following attracting nullcline manifold exists (for constant


















f zj (p, a) + szj (p, a)
))i . (14)
Note that â0j will satisfy the general form for â
i
j in Eq. (14). In addition the Euler–
Lotka equation is satisfied (for a derivation and proof, see “Appendix B”). In the
density dependent case, the age structure attractor (14) will change with the growth of
the population. Now we can use the derived submodel for derivation of the full model.
3.2 The extension tomultipopulation replicator dynamics
Now we can incorporate the above model into a multipopulation evolutionary game
(Argasinski 2006). Recall that we havew strategies andm+1 age classes indexed from
0 to m. Assume that p describes the strategy (phenotype) fraction and a describes the
frequency of the age class. As before, f ij and s
i
j describe, respectively, the fertility and
survival of the j-strategist in age class i . Two perspectives are possible (see Fig. 2):
(a) Firstly we consider the impact of the age structure in sub-populations strategi-
cally homogenous on selection of the strategies, denoted as system Sa . This can be
described by coordinates:
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 1 Schematic presentation of the discretization of the continuous age dynamics. The assumed unit time
step between age classes is associated with a change of the population state, which may induce change
of the frequency dependent payoffs. However, while the resulting changes of the vital rates are negligible,
values of payoffs can be approximated by their initial values at the beginning of the transition between age
classes
Fig. 2 The difference between two alternative formulations of the problem: system a describes the evolution
of the gene pool according to age structures of carrier subpopulations, system b describes the evolution of
the global age structure driven by strategy selection in age classes
123
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a0j , . . . , a
m
j for j = 1, . . . , w the age structure of the j-strategists
p1, . . . , pw the strategy frequencies in the whole population,









(b) Secondly we consider how selection within each age class affects the overall
age structure, denoted as system Sb. It can be described by coordinates:
pi1, . . . ., p
i
w for i = 0, . . . , m strategy frequencies in age class i
a0, . . . , am the age structure of the population,





i = ∑z niz/n .
Thus in both cases we will have a core system describing the whole population
(strategic composition in Sa and age structure in Sb) completed by the respective
subsystems describing the age structure of the subpopulation of strategy carriers (for
Sa) or the strategic age class composition (for Sb).
Now we describe the transition of coordinates between the formulations. First we
define the auxiliary canonical coordinates without subclasses:
qij = ai pij = p j aij . (15)











j=1 aij p j
, . . . ,
aiw pw∑w


















and Sb to Sa :
a j =
[

























Now let us derive systems of equations operating in both coordinate systems. In
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p j f̄ j =
m∑
i=0
ai f̄ iand s̄ =
w∑
j=1




For system Sa we have the following system of differential equations (see “Appendix
C”):










ṗ j = p j
((



























































































































j − pij s̄i−1
)
, (27)

















+ s̄ − 1
)
. (29)





























































































Note that Eq. (33) is equivalent to (25) and in both cases
1 − n
K
= 1 − s̄
f̄
⇒ n = K
(




Recall that for simplicity we assumed that functions act as the vital rates with inter-
action rate τ hidden inside. When we insert it back it would appear as τ f ij and
sij = 1 − τdij . In contrast to the basic replicator Eq. (2), parameter τ cannot eas-
ily be removed from systems Sa and Sb by simple timescale adjustment. A similar
situation occurs with the background payoff components and, which simply can-
cel out in (2) but are still present in the population size equation. This will not be
the case for systems Sa and Sb. However, for simplicity, in this paper we do not deal
explicitly with the background payoffs.
3.3 Mixed PDE-ODE versions of systems Sa and Sb
We can derive mixed PDE-ODE versions of systems Sa and Sb, where the age profile
is a continuous function, which are simpler and more mathematically elegant. The
advantage is that they are independent of the timescale since the interaction rate τ will
simply cancel out (see “Appendix E” for derivations). Thus the previous simplifying
assumption about skipping it is obsolete in this case. Payoffs d j (t, l) and f j (t, l) are
now continuous functions of the lifetime l and the strategic composition at time t . In
addition the distinction between aggregated age class survival and game round survival
discussed below Eq. (13) is not necessary since PDE versions of both systems will be
driven by game payoffs only. Therefore for system Sa we have
∂a j (t, l)
∂t
+ ∂a j (t, l)
∂l
= a j (t, l)
[





− d̄ j (t))
]
, (35)
ṗ j (t) = p j (t)
(
(
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f̄ j (t), f̄ j (t) =
∫∞
0 a j (t, l) f j (t, l)dl, d̄ j (t) =
∫∞
0 a j (t, l)
d j (t, l)dl, f̄ (t) = ∑ j p j (t) f̄ j (t) and d̄(t) =
∑
j p j (t)d̄ j (t).
For system Sb we have
∂ p j (t, l)
∂t
+ ∂ p j (t, l)
∂l
= p j (t, l)
[































0 p j (t, l) f j (t, l)dl,
d̄(t, l) = ∑ j p j (t)d̄ j (t, l), f̄ (t) =
∫∞
0 a(t, l) f̄ (t, l)dl and d̄(t) =
∫∞
0 a(t, l)d̄(t, l)dl,
where f̄ (t, l) = ∑ j p j (t, l) f̄ j (t, l) and d̄(t, l) =
∑
j p j (t, l)d̄ j (t, l).
3.4 A sex ratio example
Now we will show how the methods presented in the previous sections can be used to
extend the simpler age independent model to the age dependent case and how they can
be used to model a sexually reproducing population. We will show this methodology
by example of the synthetic sex ratio model (Argasinski 2012, 2013, 2017) combining
simple explicit genetics (similar to the more advanced approaches as in Karlin and
Lessard 1986) with rigorous strategic analysis. We will use the formulation of the
model focused on selection of genes encoding sex ratio strategies (Argasinski 2013).
Below we outline the basic details of this model. The introduction of the life cycle
perspective to theoretical studies on the sex ratio is important, since data show the
huge impact age specific mortalities can have on the dynamics of age specific sex
ratios (for example see Orzack et al. 2015 for data showing the changes of the human
sex ratio from conception to death).
We have a population consisting of x females and y males. All of them are carriers
of a single gene encoding one from a finite numberw of competing sex ratio strategies
which are expressed by females (strategy Pj ∈ [0, 1] is carried by x j females and y j
males and describes the fraction of male newborns in the brood of a female). Then
the population state can be expressed by the population’s sex ratio P = y/(x + y),
primary sex ratio (average strategy of females) P̄pr = ∑wj=1
x j
x
Pj and vectors G and
M where:
G j = x j + y j∑w
z=1 (xz + yz)
the gene frequencies,
M j = y j
x j + y j the sex ratios in the carrier subpopulations.






G j (1 − M j )
1 − P Pj . Strat-
egy genes are inherited from mother or father with probability 0.5. The sex specific
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payoff functions describe the impact of direct reproductive success (offspring of the
focal female or offspring of partners of the focal male) and the per capita normlized
contribution of the same strategy carriers of the opposite sex. Therefore, the payoffs
of male and female carriers and the average gene carrier are:






































) + M j
(1 − M j )
(
1 − P̄pr











+ (1 − M j )
]
(46)
where k is the number of offspring per female. The average payoffs are:
f̄m(G, M) = k 1 − P
P
P̄pr , (47)
f̄ (G, M) = k (1 − P) . (48)
We can obtain the system describing the dynamics of gene frequencies and the sex
ratios in the carrier subpopulations:
Ġ j = G j
(
fg(Pj , G, M) − f̄ (G, M)
)
, (49)
Ṁ j = M j ( fm(Pj , G, M) − fg(Pj , G, M)), (50)
leading to the following system of equations




















P̄pr − M j
) + (1 − M j
) (




The above system can be regarded as an example of multi-level selection since the
fate of a gene is determined by the actual composition of the carrier subpopulation
described by the carriers’ sex ratio M j and the threshold between growth and decline
is the adult sex ratio P = ∑wj=1 G j M j . The parameters M j are determined by the Tug
of War dynamics (52) describing the impact of female carriers producing newborns
according to the carried strategy Pj and randomly drawn female partners of male
carriers producing newborns according to the average strategy of females P̄pr .
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3.5 The extension of the sex ratio model to the age structured case
We will extend this system in the following way (see Fig. 3).
System Sa will be applied to extend the gene pool dynamics to the system with
explicit age structure for each subpopulation of carriers (described by aij for the j-
th gene) of the particular gene. This means that each Eq. (51) will be transformed
to the form (21) and completed by the respective subsystem (20) describing the age
structure of the subpopulation of carriers of the particular gene. In addition, for the
age structure of each strategy we will apply system Sb to describe the dynamics of
the sex ratios within each age class. Thus for each strategy, the respective subsystem
(20) will be the core subsystem (28) of system Sb, and it will be completed by the
respective subsystems (26,27), describing the dynamics of strategy carriers’ sex ratios
in particular age classes. This structure will be the generalization of the M j Eq. (52)
in the original model. Assume that survival, described by sif for females and by s
i
m
for males, depends only on sex and age. Males are active in the age classes from a to b
and females from c to d, and fractions of sexually active female and male individuals



















































Thus this is the average strategy of active females describing the proportion of males
among all newborns or zygotes. The operational sex ratio among active carriers of
strategy j and the equivalent average value for the population is
Mopj =
Smj
Smj + S fj
, Pop = S̄
m
S̄m + S̄ f . (56)
The equations on G should be updated according to the additional assumptions on age
limits of sexual activity (age classes from a to b for males and c to d for females). We
should also derive the respective forms of per capita fertility payoffs described in the
new coordinates. For derivation of the dynamics we need the following operational
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male fertility payoff of active males, average per capita gene fertility payoff and the
average fertility in the whole population (the detailed derivation is in “Appendix F”):










fg(Pj , a, G, M) = k
2
(















number of female carriers (“sisters”) of the average male carrier of the focal strategy
gene. Therefore, the male operational fertility payoff f opm describes the fertility of
their partners with the average strategy and “sisters” carrying the same gene. The gene
payoff fg describes the aggregated fertility of all female carriers and all partners of
male carriers. Thus we will obtain the following general system derived in “Appendix
G”:
Ġ j = G j
((





+ (s̄ j − s̄
))
, (60)




































+ s̄ − 1
)
, (64)




sif describes the average survival of the carrier of
the j th strategy determined by the actual carriers sex ratio. Then s̄ j = ∑mi=0 aij s̄ij
and s̄ = ∑wj=1 G j s̄ j . Thus the general Eqs. (20–22) have become Eqs. (60, 61, 64)
through the sequences: (21)→ (49)→ (60) , (20)→ (28)→ (61), (26)→ (62), (27)→
(63). Figure 3 shows how the phase space of the original model was extended to the
age structured case. After substitution of the payoff functions (see “Appendix G”) we
obtain the system:
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Fig. 3 The extension of the phase space of the sex ratiomodel to the age structured case. The gene pool phase
space is completed by respective subspaces describing the age structures among carriers of the particular
genes, as in system Sa . Then each age structure subspace is completed by subspaces describing carriers’


































+ s̄ − 1
]
, (69)
where average survival probabilities are



































are the fractions of sexually active females and males among the Pj gene carriers,
and the respective averages. Thus the selection mechanism is seriously altered by the
age structure. The above system shows that differences in mortality between sexes
and different ages of sexual activity can significantly affect the selection of individual
strategies. Equation (67) contain the terms Smj and S
f
j describing the fractions of
sexually active individuals and are the equivalent of the Tug of War dynamics (52).
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S̄ f + S fj Pj
Smj
S̄m




i > 0. (72)
Note that when we assume that there are no differences in survival probabilities
between sexes (sif = sim) then the system (65–69) reduces to the simplified version.
Equation (66) will be independent of parameters Mij and the Eq. (68) will converge
to a constant value over the whole life cycle (Mij = M0j for all i). Therefore all
strategies will have the same age structure. In effect the bracketed term
(
s̄ j − s̄
)
,
describing the excess of the mortality payoff from average mortality, will vanish in
Eq. (65) and selection of the genes will be driven by the excess fertility payoff bracket(
fg(Pj , a, G, M) − f̄ (a, G, M)
)
describing the Fisherian mechanism driven by the
difference in reproductive value between the sexes;
(
















⎦ S̄ f , (73)
which is equivalent to the Shaw–Mohler formula (Shaw and Mohler 1953). If we
assume that both sexes are mature in the same age classes then S fj = 1 − Smj , we
have that operational sex ratios (56) are Mopj = Smj and Pop = S̄m (S̄ f = 1 − Pop).
Therefore for the operational sex ratio Pop = 0.5 the above formula equals zero for all
strategies. When we additionally assume that the sex specific survivals for different
ages are the same, the system replicates the results of the original model . In the
general case if S fj = S̄ f and Smj = S̄m then obviously the operational sex ratios (56)
are equal. In other cases, the strategies with the greater fraction of the sex which is
in the minority among active individuals (according to the operational sex ratio Pop)
will have a greater value of (73). Since all individuals of the same sex suffer the same
mortality, the values of parameters S fj and S
m
j are determined by the allocation of
sexes at birth, determined by their encoded strategy. Due to the constant brood size k,
an increase of female newborns leads to a decrease of male newborns and vice versa.
Therefore, this allocation will determine operational sex ratios and selection should
act accordingly to differences in operational sex ratios, similarly to (51).
We can see this in Fig. 4 depicting a numerical simulation for the case of three
competing strategies P1 = 0.05, P2 = 0.55, P3 = 0.95 with 25 age classes plus
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infant age class 0. For simplicity we assumed that age class survivals will be the
same with only one change at some arbitrary age, different for males and females. For
females we have survival 0.95 until age 10 and 0.80 in subsequent ages. For males
we have 0.88 until age 15 and then 0.72 subsequently. By definition survival in the
last age classes is zero. Females are fertile from age c = 8 until age d = 15 while
males are active from age a = 8 until age b = 20. The initial population size was
n(0) = 40 with a carrying capacity K = 10 000. Initial conditions are G1(0) = 0.9,
G2(0) = G3(0) = 0.05, M01 = 0.7 and M02 = M03 = 0.1. We start from a very
young population where adult age classes have frequencies 0.001 leading to a 0.025
proportion of non-infant individuals and sex ratios are Mi1 = 0.9 and Mi2 = Mi3 = 0.8.
These exaggerated conditions show the initial dynamics of the growing cohort leading
to the interesting patterns depicted in Fig. 5 depicting the age structure and Fig 6
showing the dynamics of age specific sex ratios.
Figure 7 shows the delayed convergence to the respective Euler–Lotka manifolds.
At the global equilibrium excess fertility payoffs (73) (the difference between the
payoff and the mean) are not equal to zero because they must balance the nonzero
values of the excess survival payoffs for growth rates to be equal (Fig. 8). Therefore,
the classical Fisherian equilibrium focused only on fertility payoffs is not reached here.
A question arises about the interplay between fertility and survival and how it leads
to the primary sex ratio of 0.5. In addition the operational sex ratio is far from 0.5.
Therefore in this case the Fisherian mechanism is not enough to explain the origins
of the primary sex ratio of 0.5. Figure 4 shows that the mechanism driven by the
operational sex ratios still works but all values are rescaled, and we also have different
mortalities for different strategies. The interplay between the Fisherian mechanism,
driven by fertility and differences in reproductive value between the sexes, and age
structure, driven by survival differences between the sexes, needs an explanationwhich
will be the subject of future work.
4 Discussion
In thisworkwe presented a newmodelling framework combining evolutionary dynam-
ics with demographic structure. This approach can be a useful tool in the development
of the synthesis between evolutionary game theory and life history theory. We started
with the derivation of the ODE discretized approximation of the McKendrick von
Foerster model of age structured populations and its critical manifold equivalent to
the Euler–Lotka equation. This was extended to the explicit case of multiple compet-
ing strategies and transformed into two types of age structured replicator dynamics.
The first focused on the selection of strategies when each strategy is described by
a subsystem describing the dynamics of the age structure. The second focused on
the age structure of the whole population and a subsystem of the strategies within
each age class. These led to huge ODE systems which are equivalent to systems of
Bernadelli–Lewis–Leslie matrices. Another complication is that for the discretized
age structure we need age class survival functions which will describe the aggregated
outcomes of all interactions (game rounds) that have happened during a single time
unit. This survival function is distinct from game round survival which can be used for
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Towards a replicator dynamics model of age structured populations Page 21 of 39    44 
Fig. 4 Panel a dynamics of gene frequencies, panel b operational sex ratios, for strategies Mop0.05, M
op
0.55,
Mop0.95 and primary and operational sex ratios of the population P̄pr and Pop , panel c population size.
Trajectories show that Pop is the threshold between growth and decline of the gene frequency depending
on the value of Mopj . This is shown by the example of strategy 0.05, where bumps in the marked areas
are caused by two types of events. The first is when the strategy’s operational sex ratio Mopj passes the
population’s operational sex ratio Pop , which is the threshold between growth and decline. The second is
when the average operational sex ratio Pop passes the value of 0.5 which inverts the strategic situation,
since the opposite sex is in the minority when this happens
the derivation of the fertility-survival trade-off functions used in situations when only
survivors of the interaction can reproduce (Argasinski and Broom 2012, 2018a, b).
In addition we have outlined the PDE versions of the obtained systems to indicate a
future direction of research.
Both approaches are combined in the illustrative example of a sex ratio model.
This is an extension of the dynamic sex ratio model (Argasinski 2012, 2013, 2017). It
shows that when we assume different mortalities for both sexes, the classical Fisherian
explanation based on the differences of reproductive values of offspring is not enough
to explain convergence to the primary sex ratio of 0.5. The excess fertility payoff
does not converge to 0 which would be equivalent to an equal reproductive values for
both sexes, but its non-zero value is equal to the value of the excess survival payoff.
The question of how this mechanism works in detail should be explained in future
research. The new model provides a theoretical framework that can be used to explain
the mechanisms shaping the patterns observable in data collected on age specific sex
ratios from conception to death, as in Orzack et al. (2015) and Orzack (2016).
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Fig. 5 Trajectories of age classes. The initial behaviour is caused by huge differences in the initial sex
ratios. The assumed changes in age specific survivals slightly affect the trajectories
The obtained results clearly show that a life cycle perspective plays a crucial role in
evolutionary processes. In the classical approaches to evolutionary game theory indi-
viduals cannot change their properties during their lifetime. Thus their life history is a
memoryless process, and survival of a single interaction does not change the state of
the individual. This is caused by the fact that the classical approaches to evolutionary
games are focused on the strategies interpreted as patterns of behaviour, not on the
individual itself. The exception to this rule is the state based approach (Houston and
McNamara 1999; Argasinski and Rudnicki 2020). The explicit description of the life
cycle and the different payoffs at different ages leads to a more complicated game
theoretic structure. In particular a mixed PDE-ODE approach will lead to more com-
plex payoff functions based on continuous distributions of ages for different strategies.
This will need more sophisticated methods, such as models with function valued traits
(Oechssler and Riedel 2001; Dieckmann et al. 2006, vanVeelen and Spreij 2009), state
based games (Houston and McNamara 1991, 1999; Argasinski and Rudnicki 2020)
or “large games” with a distinction between strategy sets and population states (Wiec-
zorek andWiszniewska 1998;Wieczorek 2004, 2005), as opposed to basic two person
matrix games. The modelling framework proposed in this paper can also be a useful
tool in the research on animal personalities The combination of game theoretic anal-
ysis with an explicit age structure will allow us to analyze the relationships between
behavioural strategies (such as aggression or cowardice) and life history traits (such
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Fig. 6 Trajectories of age specific sex ratios. The pattern caused by the assumed changes in survival
probabilities is clearly visible
Fig. 7 Aplot of the convergence to the respectiveEuler–Lotkamanifolds (dashed lines) for arbitrarily chosen
age classes for strategy 0.05. The convergence is delayed by some inertia caused by the age dynamics
as allocation of energy into growth or reproduction). This is important because life
history trade-offs are shaped by external mortality which is the outcome of interactions
with the environment. On the other hand, the demographic outcomes of interactions
such as mortality are affected by phenotypic traits such as growth shaped by life his-
tory strategies (Wolf andWeissing 2010; Wolf and McNamara 2012). This constitutes
life-history-behavioural feedback.
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Fig. 8 Plots of the excess fertility payoffs
(
fg(Pj , a, G, M) − f̄ (a, G, M)
)
, excess mortality payoffs
(
s̄ j − s̄
)




(1 − n/K )+(s̄ j − s̄
)
from the gene pool dynamics
(65). Fertility payoffs are not equal as in the classical theory, and the same situation is true for mortality
payoffs, but the right hand sides of the equations are zero. This shows that the explanation for the primary
sex ratio being 0.5 needs an explicit consideration of the interplay between fertility and mortality
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Appendix A: Derivation of the frequency equations
(1) Discretization of the of McKendrick von Foerster model (10) We need to divide
the continuous time into separate discrete unit compartments describing age classes
consisting of individuals of ages from the interval (l, l + 1]. Recall that game rounds
occur at intensity τ . Note that the exponential dynamics emerges from an aggregation
of survival from some independent interactions, when the focal individual survives (or
not) several events and the aggregated survival is the product of survival probabilities of
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those events. However we can imagine a timescale where interactions are sufficiently
rare, so that only a small fraction of individuals play a single round of the game.
Then the dynamics is technically linear and survival is described by the first term of
the Taylor series of the exponential function. Thus assume that time interval dt =
dl = 1 is small enough that a small fraction τd(t, l)dt of individuals will die due
to aggregated outcomes of independent game rounds. The remaining 1− τd(t, l)dt
survivors will be moved to the next age compartment. Then from Eq. (9) we have
that n(t + 1, l + 1) = (1 − τd(t, l)) n(t, l) = s(t, l)n(t, l) which describes the move
from point t, l to point t + 1, l + 1. Assume that during a unit interval all surviving
individuals from age l will be moved to age l + 1 while all individuals from l + 1 will
be moved from this age to the next age step or die. Therefore during a single time unit
we have linear movement occurring at incoming rate s(t, l −1)n(t, l −1) and removal
rate -n(t, l), since all individuals will be removed during a single time unit. Therefore
this linear process can be well approximated by the first order Taylor expansion for
t = 1 where the bracketed term can be interpreted as the first derivative;
n(t + 1, l) = n(t, l) + [s(t, l − 1)n(t, l − 1) − n(t, l)], (74)
therefore the bracketed term constitutes derivative dn/dt , leading to
dn(t, l)
dt
= s(t, l − 1)n(t, l − 1) − n(t, l).
Note that (74) can be presented in the form n(t + 1, l) = s(t, l − 1)n(t, l − 1) which
leads to the Leslie matrix (7). When we change notation to the numbered age classes
describing age increments and assume that aggregated survival rate si (t) and fertility




ni (t)τ f i (t) − n0(t), (75)
ṅi (t) = si−1(t)ni−1(t) − ni (t) i = 1, . . . , m. (76)
It is reasonable to assume that s0 = 1, (other values are equivalent to s0 = 1 with
rescaled fertilities f i ) and sm = 0.
However, to be compatiblewith the replicator dynamics and game theoreticmachin-
ery, the dynamics should be expressed in termsof phenotype frequencies. Let us change
the coordinates to the frequencies ai = ni/n (with n = ∑mi=0 ni ) describing the age
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i = 1, . . . , m. (78)
Therefore, this system can be presented as a system of frequency dependent replicator
equations ȧi = ai (r i − r̄) and a single equation on the scaling parameter ṅ = nr̄ .
Since
∑m



























Then we can formulate a system of frequency dependent replicator equations by trans-
forming Eq. (78) for i = 1, . . . , m (the equation for 0 is redundant and can be removed








si−1 − 1 − r̄
)




























(2) Frequency and density dependence and the choice of time unit determining
the discretization step When the above system describes the dynamics of the age
structure of the subpopulation of carriers of some strategy competing with other
strategies (indexed by subscripts) then the parameters sij (t) = 1 − τdij (p(t), a(t))




f ij (1 − n/k) − dij
)
) are game
payoffs depending on strategy frequencies p j = n j/∑k nk (and their age distribu-
tions, but nowwe limit our reasoning to strategy frequencies p).Wewant to choose the
longest possible time step to reduce the number of equations. However the frequencies
will change in time, so the discretization step cannot be too big, since the aggregated
payoffs during unit interval will depend on the changes of τdij (p(t)) and τ f
i
j (p(t))
during that time interval. The time unit should be short enough that these vital rates
will not change significantly and the number of individuals will change nearly linearly
within each age class. Thus we should analyze how much the strategy frequencies p j
can change during unit time and how this affects the vital rates. For small t = 1 we
have a change of
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(positive or negative) for each j , leading to the changen = ∑ j n j = n(t)τ r̃(t)t
for the population size. Then
p j (t + 1) = n j (t)
n(t) + n +
n j




n(t) + n +
n j
n(t) + n







n(t) + n = p j (t) +
n j − p j (t)n
n(t) + n .
Therefore p j (t + 1) = p j (t) + p j where vector p consists of
p j (τ ) = n j − p j (t)n
n(t) + n =
τ
1 + τ r̃(t)) p j (t)
(
r̃ j (t) − r̃(t)
)
. (82)
Thus the pace of increment is nearly linear or slower since τ/(1 + τ r̃(t)) < τ . We
can set the timescale by adjusting parameter τ in the formulae  f ij = f ij (p(t) +
p(τ )) − f ij (p(t)) and dij = dij (p(t) + p(τ )) − dij (p(t)) to make their values
small enough that τ f ij and τd
i
j are negligible. For the density factor we have
that (1 − n(t + 1)/K ) = (1 − (n(t) + n)/K ) and the change of fertility rate is
−τ f ij (p(t))n/K , thus it depends on τ/K and is negligible for even big time steps.
AppendixB: The stationaryagedistributionand theEuler–Lotkaequa-
tion in the continuous case
From (80) (recall that τ is hidden in the fertilities f i ), for the non-infant age classes








f i + si
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f i + si ) =
âi−1si−1
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Then
∑m







































(note the similarity to the Euler–Lotka equation). The stable age structure is a unique
vector of frequencies among age classes, conditional on the averageMalthusian growth
rate of the population. Now let us prove the equivalencewith the Euler–Lotka equation.






























Frequency equilibrium implies that per capita growth rates in all age classes are equal
to the average growth rate r̄(â). Thus equality will also be satisfied for the growth rate



















which is the Euler–Lotka equation.
Appendix C: Derivation of system Sa
We start from the Malthusian system describing the dynamics of age classes in the






j − n0j , (89)
ṅij = si−1j ni−1j − nij . (90)
According to (11) the above system can be transformed into the frequency replicator
dynamics of age classes:
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The Malthusian equation describing the growth of j-strategists is











Then the replicator dynamics for the changes of strategy frequencies are
ṗ j = p j
(
r̄ j − r̄
) = p j
((
f̄ j − f̄
) + (s̄ j − s̄)
)
, (93)




j , f̄ =
∑w





s̄ = ∑wj=1 p j s̄ j . This gives






















































The equation on the scaling parameter is















Then to add neutral density dependence the fertilities f ij should be multiplied by the
logistic suppression coefficient (1 − n/K ) leading to the system:










ṗ j = p j
((







































































































Appendix D: Derivation of system Sb
System Sb produces more complex equations. As in “Appendix C”, to add neutral
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j − ni . (110)


















































j − n, (111)




























































































The above system for each age class should be completed by the replicator dynamics
describing the changes of strategic composition of this particular age class. Since
ai pij = nij/n we have the following form of (103):
ṅ0j = n0j
(∑m
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This is the system (26,27,28,29).
Appendix E: Rescaling theMcKendrick von Foerster model to
frequencies
We can rescale the McKendrick von Foerster (10) equation to relative frequencies
a(t, l) = n(t, l)/n(t) where n(t) = ∫∞0 n(t, l)dl is the size of the whole population.
In this case the interaction rate τ should be explicitly considered. Note that in the
game theoretic applications the vital rates τd(t, l) and τ f (t, l) will change in time
due to the changes of the strategic population composition. Since n(t, l) = a(t, l)n(t)









a(t, l) + ∂a(t, l)
∂l
n(t) = −τd(t, l)a(t, l)n(t).
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= a(t, l) [−τd(t, l) − τ r̃(t)] , (125)
where per capita growth rate
















and the boundary condition will be






a(t, l) f (t, l)dl.
Note that we can remove τ from Eq. (125) by a change of timescale. We can use Eq.
(125) as the PDE equivalent of Eq. (20) from system Sa and (28) from Sb, and rescale
Eq. (10) for j th strategy to p j (t, l) = n j (t, l)/n(t, l) (where n(t, l) = ∑ j n j (t, l))
to obtain the PDE equivalent of Eqs. (26,27). Then since n j (t, l) = p j (t, l)n(t, l),
∂ p j (t, l)
∂t
n(t, l) + ∂n(t, l)
∂t
p j (t, l) + ∂ p j (t, l)
∂l
n(t, l) + ∂n(t, l)
∂l
p j (t, l)
= −τd j (t, l)p j (t, l)n(t, l),
which leads to
[
∂ p j (t, l)
∂t










p j (t, l)
= −τd j (t, l)p j (t, l)n(t, l).
Substituting using Eq. (10) describing whole population and division by n(t, l) leads
to:
∂ p j (t, l)
∂t
+ ∂ p j (t, l)
∂l
= −τ p j (t, l)
[
d j (t, l) − d̄(t, l)
]
,





0 p j (t, l) f j (t, l)dl. Parameter τ can easily be removed in the result-
ing equivalents of systems Sa and Sb by the timescale adjustment, thus the continuous
framework is timescale independent and can be driven by the game demographic
payoff functions.
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Appendix F: Derivation of the payoff functions for the age structured
sex ratio model
Our operational payoff functions of active individuals (41) and ( 43) can be presented
in new coordinates in the following way:

















































Note that in the age structured case x , y, x j and y j describe the numbers of sexually
active individuals of both sexes.Males are active in age classes from a to b and females
from c to d. Fractions of sexually active females and males in the new formulation










Then S̄ f = ∑wj=1 G j S fj and S̄m =
∑w
j=1 G j Smj are the respective averages, and
operational sex ratios are Mopj =
Smj
Smj + S fj
and Pop = S̄
m
S̄m + S̄ f . Then the opera-
tional fertility payoff function of a gene carrier will be
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To obtain the per capita gene carrier fertility payoff, necessary to derive the replicator
equations, we multiply the above by the fraction of active carriers
[














































Similarly we derive the per capita average fertility. Then the average payoff (48)
becomes the operational average fertility of the active individuals
f op(a, G, M) = k (1 − Pop
)
. (136)
Again to obtain the per capita average fertility payoff we multiply this by the fraction




Smj + S fj
]
= S̄m + S̄ f . This leads
to
f̄ (a, G, M) = k (1 − Pop
) (
S̄m + S̄ f
)
= k S̄ f . (137)
Appendix G: Derivation of the age structured replicator equations
The bracket describing the fertility stage of the gene pool dynamics will be
(












































⎦ S̄ f . (140)
The bracket describing the mortality stage will be
(
























































sif is the average survival of the j th strategy carrier in

















G j s̄ j (143)
are the average Pj carrier and population survival probabilities, leading to


























which is Eq. (65). Now we derive the equations describing the dynamics of sex ratios
in the particular age classes in the subpopulation of carriers of strategy Pj which will
be equivalent to the original equations on M j . We use the version of Eq. (26) for two
types (sexes) where the same payoffs are obtained in certain age ranges specific for
each type (thus the term
∑m
i=0 ai pij f
i
j will be f1
∑b
i=a ai pi1). In effect (26) for type











since f̄ = ∑mi=0 ai
∑w
z=1 piz f iz in (26) is the average fertility in the population (in our
case the subpopulation of carriers of the j-th strategy). To translate the above equation
into the notation used in the sex ratiomodel we should apply the following substations:
p01 → M0j , f1 → f opm , f2 → f opf and f̄ → fg since
∑b
i=a ai pi1 is equivalent to Smj .
Here there are no different strategies indexed by a lower index but two opposite sexes,
thus for any particular gene we will have a single equation describing the sex ratio in
the zero age class:
Ṁ0j =
(















































































Note that the above equation is equivalent to the Tug of War dynamics of the original
model, and so should be completed by the respective equations for all age classes (27),







m − Mij s̄i−1j
)
. (148)
The equations describing the age structure (28) of the entire population of carriers of
the j-th strategy (with fg acting as f̄ j ) will be Eq. (66)
ȧij = ai−1j s̄i−1j − aij
[


















































From (64) and (59) we obtain the population size Eq. ( 69). Therefore we have derived
the system (65,66,67,68,69).
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